Catherine Nixey’s book Heresy provides a descriptive account of recurrent religious tropes, but no analysis of why those particular ideas keep appearing and not others. Is there some intrinsic bias in humans towards certain metaphysical concepts?
That’s a sharp observation. Catherine Nixey’s Heresy is indeed rich in narrative texture and historical detail, especially in how it shows certain religious motifs resurfacing across time. But as you note, she doesn’t really probe why those tropes—dualism, salvation, apocalypse, sacred texts, chosen people—keep recurring.
Your question gets to the deeper cognitive and anthropological level: is there some intrinsic bias in human cognition or social structure that makes particular metaphysical ideas more likely to arise and persist?
There are a few compelling angles to explore:
1. Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR)
Researchers like Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett argue that religious concepts are “minimally counterintuitive”—they violate just enough of our expectations to be memorable, but not so much that they become incoherent. For example, a god who is invisible but knows everything is easier to grasp than a god with no form, no location, no intention, and no agency.
This suggests:
- Anthropomorphism: We naturally attribute agency and intention to the world (useful for survival: better to mistake wind for a predator than vice versa).
- Theory of Mind: We can imagine minds that are separate from bodies—priming the idea of spirits or gods.
- Essentialism: We assume entities have hidden, immutable “essences”—which fits nicely with souls and sacredness.
So, metaphysical ideas like souls, gods, and afterlives are not arbitrary inventions but spring from how our minds already carve up the world.
2. Social Cohesion and Group Psychology
Some metaphysical beliefs serve social functions:
- Afterlife beliefs can reinforce morality (“You’ll be judged”).
- Chosen people or elect groups foster group solidarity and identity.
- Sacrifice and purity rituals create a sense of shared seriousness and commitment.
These aren’t just “false” ideas—they’re adaptive cultural technologies that bind groups, justify hierarchies, and stabilize norms. Ideas that promote group survival are more likely to stick around and evolve into institutional religions.
3. Narrative Structures and Pattern-Seeking
Humans are storytellers. We look for patterns, causes, arcs. Metaphysical systems often mirror this:
- A fall or original flaw
- A cosmic drama
- A redemptive figure
- A final reckoning
This narrative format seems to be a default way our brains seek to make meaning in a chaotic world.
So yes, there probably is an intrinsic bias—both cognitive and cultural—towards certain metaphysical ideas. Nixey’s book shows the recurrence but doesn’t explain the structural inevitability behind it. The ideas that persist aren’t just the most imaginative—they’re the most fit for minds like ours in societies like ours.
If the reasons are all cognitive and adaptive, what are the philosophical implications?
If the recurrence of certain metaphysical ideas can be fully explained by cognitive biases and adaptive pressures, then several major philosophical implications follow, especially for how we think about truth, meaning, and ethics.
1. Undermining Metaphysical Realism
If beliefs in gods, souls, and cosmic justice arise not because they’re true but because they’re psychologically sticky or socially useful, then the metaphysical content of religion starts to look like a kind of evolutionary by-product or narrative “side-effect”—a mythology generated by how our brains work.
- This leads to a kind of epistemic deflation: just because a belief is deeply intuitive or widespread doesn’t make it true.
- Philosophically, this is aligned with constructivism or anti-realism: metaphysical systems might not map onto objective reality—they may just reflect the structure of human cognition.
2. The Nietzschean Problem of Meaning
If metaphysical beliefs are adaptive fictions, what happens when we see through them?
- Nietzsche famously worried that the “death of God” would pull the rug out from under morality and meaning. If the ideas that gave life coherence are illusions, can we replace them with anything equally compelling?
- This is more than a psychological problem—it’s a philosophical crisis. If we are meaning-seeking animals who’ve evolved to believe comforting fictions, then disillusionment can leave us nihilistic, or at least permanently homesick for a metaphysical world we no longer believe in.
3. Ethics Without Foundations
Religions often ground ethical obligations in metaphysics: e.g., divine command, karma, cosmic justice. If we set those aside, we have to ask:
- What remains as the basis for ethics?
- Can secular or post-religious ethics motivate action and bind communities as effectively?
This is where thinkers like Levinas (as you’ve noted before) become crucial—re-rooting ethics not in metaphysics, but in human encounter, vulnerability, and responsibility. But it’s a humbler, more fragile sort of ethic—less about universal laws, more about proximity and presence.
4. The Tragic Structure of Human Thought
Finally, there’s a more existential implication: if our minds are wired to invent gods, and if we come to see through that invention, then we might be permanently alienated from what feels most natural and meaningful.
- Like creatures built for flight who find themselves grounded.
- Or like artists who lose belief in beauty.
This is the tragic philosophical condition: to understand why we believe, but no longer be able to believe in good faith. It raises questions about authenticity, nostalgia, and the ethics of belief. Is it better to live with a fiction if it brings depth and purpose? Or to face the void, and build meaning without illusions?
How does all this square with the terror of existential anihilation at death which consciousness brings.
We are creatures who can imagine our own extinction, and that self-awareness brings not only knowledge but a kind of metaphysical vertigo. The terror of non-being—of consciousness blinking out—isn’t just a psychological inconvenience. It’s a philosophical wound. And everything you’ve raised so far—our cognitive bias toward metaphysical ideas, the recurrence of religious tropes, the absence of deep analysis in works like Nixey’s—all starts to circle around this existential anxiety.
So let’s look at how this squares up.
1. Religion as an Antidote to Death Terror
Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death is a key text here. He argued that culture—especially religion—is a “hero system” designed to shield us from the unbearable knowledge of mortality.
- Religion offers symbolic immortality (legacy, the soul) or literal immortality (heaven, reincarnation).
- Even belief in cosmic justice implies a world that continues after us, where our actions still matter.
If you view religion through this lens, its metaphysical structures aren’t just cognitive quirks—they are defense mechanisms built into cultures to help humans bear the unbearable.
So the recurrence of certain metaphysical ideas isn’t just about brains being tricked—it’s about the deep existential utility of believing that death isn’t the end.
2. Disenchantment and the Cost of Lucidity
Once we accept that these beliefs might be adaptations—not truths—we’re left staring into what Pascal called “the eternal silence of these infinite spaces.”
- Without metaphysical consolation, we confront death as annihilation.
- We become like Meursault in The Stranger—lucid, awake, and alone under an indifferent sky.
There’s something profoundly modern in this—this lucid despair. And it raises the question: is full lucidity psychologically sustainable? Or is some degree of illusion necessary for a life worth living?
3. Responses to Death Without Metaphysics
Let’s map out a few philosophical responses that don’t fall back into supernatural belief:
a. Camus’ Revolt
Camus rejected both religion and nihilism. Instead, he proposed revolt—a kind of defiant embrace of life despite its absurdity.
“The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”
This doesn’t remove the terror—but it transforms it into something like courage.
b. Heidegger’s Authenticity
Heidegger thought death was not just an event, but a way of being—being-toward-death. Only by confronting death fully, not denying it, can one live authentically.
- Death individualizes us.
- It frees us from the “they” (das Man), from inauthentic social roles.
- It’s not an end to be denied, but a horizon that gives shape to life.
c. Levinas’ Ethical Infinity
Levinas, intriguingly, treats death not primarily as a personal crisis, but as the background to responsibility for the Other.
- We are finite, and this finitude calls us into ethical relation.
- The “face of the Other” interrupts our desire to close the world into a knowable, survivable system.
- There’s no conquering death—but in responding to the Other, we find meaning that transcends solipsistic dread.
This is the most ethical response to death: not denial, not defiance, but devotion.
4. The Philosophical Implication You’re Pointing To
Here’s what ties it all together:
If metaphysical ideas recur because they shield us from death, and if we’ve come to see through those shields, then the philosophical question becomes not “What is true?” but:
What stance can we take toward death that is honest, but not paralyzing?
This is where post-religious, existential philosophy lives: in that gap between full lucidity and the need to keep going. It’s a space of tragic consciousness, of defiant meaning-making, of fragile transcendence without metaphysics.
Does Heidegger’s “horizon that gives shape to life” connect with the phenomenology of time?
Yes, Heidegger’s idea of death as the “horizon that gives shape to life” is deeply entangled with his phenomenology of time. In fact, Being and Time is, among other things, a radical rethinking of what time is, not as an abstract sequence of moments, but as something lived, embodied, and structured by our finitude.
Let’s unpack how death, horizon, and time all interweave in Heidegger’s thought.
1. Time Is Not a Sequence, But a Structure of Care
For Heidegger, time isn’t a neutral flow of “nows” ticking by. Instead, Dasein (his term for human being) is always ahead of itself, always projecting into possibilities, always interpreting the present in light of what it has been and what it might become.
This is temporality, not clock time. And it has a specific shape:
- Future: I project possibilities for myself (who I might be).
- Past: I carry a thrownness, a history I didn’t choose.
- Present: I engage with the world meaningfully in terms of what I’m becoming and where I’ve come from.
This tripartite structure—“ecstatic temporality”—is what constitutes Dasein’s being.
2. Death as the Ultimate Possibility
Heidegger calls death the “possibility of the impossibility of any further existence.” It’s not just an event at the end of life—it’s a structuring horizon that makes all other possibilities meaningful.
Because I will die, my time is finite, and this finitude gives weight to everything I do. Without death, Heidegger says, we’d float endlessly in inauthentic, interchangeable busyness. But death brings urgency, gravity, and singularity.
So: death temporalizes us.
It anchors our futurity, our sense of care, our capacity for authenticity. In that sense, death is not a thing to be awaited—it’s a way of being we must own if we are to live meaningfully.
3. Death as Horizon
A horizon is not a limit in the sense of a wall—it’s a perspective-giving boundary. You can only see a landscape in terms of its horizon.
Likewise, for Heidegger:
- Death is the horizon of life.
- It is what gives shape, meaning, and urgency to being.
- It forces us out of inauthentic absorption in the “they” (das Man)—the everyday distractions and public interpretations—and presses us to own our life as our own.
This isn’t meant to be morbid, but clarifying. Heidegger wants to rescue us from living as though we’re immortal, always postponing what matters.
4. Phenomenology of Time = Phenomenology of Meaning
Heidegger’s innovation is to link time not to objects or clocks, but to existential meaning. Time isn’t “out there”—it’s how Dasein is. And it’s how Dasein experiences itself: as a being who has a past it didn’t choose, a future it cannot control, and a present full of care.
Death, then, doesn’t just end time. It shapes it.
In Summary
Yes, death as horizon is inseparable from Heidegger’s phenomenology of time:
- Temporality is the structure of our being—a being that always exists in light of its end.
- Death is the horizon that lets this structure take form.
- Without death, there’s no urgency, no authenticity, no individuation—just a flat, endless now.
So death isn’t the opposite of life—it’s what makes life finite, meaningful, and mine.
Why is the past “a thrownness, a history I didn’t choose”. Surely the past is full of what we have done (although not necessarily achieved)
This is a rich tension, and you’ve zeroed in on a key ambiguity—one that Heidegger himself both embraces and complicates.
You’re right to say: “The past is full of what we have done.” That’s undeniably true in a narrative, ethical, and existential sense. The past holds our choices, our efforts, our mistakes, and unfinished longings. It feels like ours—because it is. But Heidegger’s concept of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) points to something deeper and less under our control. So let’s explore this apparent contradiction.
1. What Heidegger Means by “Thrownness”
Heidegger’s “thrownness” refers to the fact that we always find ourselves already in a situation—in a world not of our choosing, with a body, a language, a culture, a history, and a mortality we didn’t select. We are, in a sense, hurled into being.
So when he says the past is “a history I didn’t choose,” he’s talking about the conditions of existence:
- I didn’t choose to be born into this century.
- I didn’t choose my parents, my language, my early traumas, the state of the world, or my finitude.
- Even my ability to choose emerges within a thrown context.
This is not to deny agency—but to ground it. You act, but you always act from somewhere, within a world that precedes you.
2. But the Past Is Also My Project
And this is your crucial counterpoint: while I’m thrown, I’m also projective. Heidegger calls this “projection” (Entwurf)—I am always becoming, always engaged in a task of self-interpretation.
- My past includes what I’ve made of my thrownness.
- It includes my choices, even my failures.
- The past is not just what happened to me—it’s what I’ve done, what I’ve meant, even what I’ve tried and failed to do.
So in Heidegger’s framework, the past has two intertwined dimensions:
- Thrown: what I inherit.
- Owned (in authenticity): what I claim, assume, or reinterpret.
You don’t choose your facticity, but you can choose your response to it. This is why authenticity isn’t heroism—it’s responsibility. A willingness to say: yes, this is my life, including what I didn’t choose.
3. The Past as Both Weight and Possibility
Heidegger would likely agree with your observation, just on different terms. In fact, what you’re pointing to is central to his idea of historicity:
Dasein “is” its past—not by living in nostalgia or regret, but by being responsible for how that past lives on in the present.
So yes:
- The past is not just what happens to us.
- It’s also what we carry, what we reinterpret, and what we respond to.
- It’s mine, even if I didn’t fully make it.
4. Thrownness Doesn’t Mean Passivity
A common misunderstanding is to think of thrownness as fatalistic. But in Heidegger, thrownness + projection = freedom in situatedness. He’s not saying we are puppets of circumstance. He’s saying:
- Freedom isn’t abstract choice from nowhere.
- It’s engaged, located, and existential—it happens in time, through a body, in a world.
In that sense, your insight adds necessary depth: our past isn’t just an alien given. It’s a lived, interpreted part of our becoming.
So, to draw it together:
- Yes, the past includes your actions and projects.
- But it’s always entangled with what you didn’t choose: your givenness, your facticity.
- Authenticity is not erasing thrownness, but taking it up as your own.
So is the choice between 1. “no authenticity, no individuation—just a flat, endless now” (in denial about the terror of death, or some desparate fantasy of life after death), or 2 having the courage to acknowledge our finality and live accordingly
This is the existential crossroads Heidegger (and others like Camus and Kierkegaard in different ways) describes. That basic choice between:
1. Inauthenticity
Living in denial, distraction, or fantasy.
- You defer responsibility by taking refuge in the “they” (das Man)—social roles, conventions, surface meanings.
- You avoid facing your mortality by burying yourself in routine or adopting consoling stories without truly owning them.
- This is a kind of existential sleepwalking—not because your life is meaningless, but because you’re not confronting the conditions of its meaning.
Heidegger doesn’t mock this state—it’s the default condition of human life. But he calls it inauthentic, because it avoids the truth of one’s finitude and responsibility.
It’s the flat, endless now. No individuation. No deep responsibility.
“One dies, people say—not I die.”
2. Authenticity
Living in lucid relationship with your finitude.
- You acknowledge death—not as an event to be obsessed over, but as the horizon that gives shape to every choice.
- You take responsibility for your life as yours, not just a role assigned by culture or circumstance.
- You stop waiting for someone else to give your life meaning—and start being the author of its unfolding, with full awareness of its limits.
This takes courage, but not heroism. It’s more like sobriety—a clear-sighted relationship to what is. You still fear death perhaps, but you no longer let that fear outsource your responsibility.
But—Importantly—it’s Not a Binary
Heidegger isn’t offering a once-and-for-all choice, like a moralistic fork in the road. Authenticity isn’t a constant state. It’s a mood, a disclosure, a possibility that comes and goes. We fall into inauthenticity all the time. The point is to be able to hear the call of conscience when it comes—to be capable of awakening.
And Beyond Heidegger?
Some thinkers go further than Heidegger’s structural analysis and ask:
- Can love, ethics, or art be a response to finitude?
- Can we forge a kind of fragile transcendence, not through fantasy, but through deep engagement with this life?
- Can we make peace not just with dying, but with having lived?
Levinas, for instance, reorients the whole question: What if the face of the Other is more primordial than death? What if responsibility, not anxiety, is the deepest human experience?
So yes, your framing is apt: it’s a choice between hiding from the truth of death in fantasies or distractions—or facing it with courage and living meaningfully because it ends.
The real challenge, perhaps, is this:
Can one love life, in its finitude, not in spite of death, but because of it?
Do you find that second path—the lucid path—feels livable? Or do you sometimes feel it’s too stark, too cold, without some residue of transcendence?